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RECENT CASES
sued by his spouse is entitled to reimbursement from his insurer.' 2 Conversely,
the presence of such a clause effectively bars recovery.1 -
Since Pennsylvania requires contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors
and thus would ordinarily allow the Railroad Company to enforce contribution
against the husband, the further question of whether the non-liability clause
should prevent the enforcement of contribution against the husband's insurer
is squarely posed. The manifest purpose of such a clause is to discourage
fraudulent and collusive law suits.14 It is at once apparent that this danger
is in no way lessened merely because the negligent joint tortfeasor rather than
the insured is seeking to recover from the insurer. Since the exclusion clause
will prevent the husband from obtaining payment directly from the insurer,
it should be equally effective to prevent a joint tortfeasor from indirectly ob-
taining such payment through enforcement of contribution. If, in the instant
case, the insurer has been compelled to indemnify the joint tortfeasor, the
indemnification would, for all practical purposes, have constituted payment
to the insured's wife. It is submitted that this result would be undesirable
as making the insurance policy applicable in contradiction of its express terms.
WALTER AURAN
PUBLIC TRIAL - EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS AND PUBLIC - The defendant
was accused of compulsory prostitution. The trial judge, shortly after the
start of the trial, on his own motion and over the defendant's objection, made
an order excluding the general public and press from the court room. Friends
and relatives of the defendant were allowed to remain. On appeal it was
held, that allowing only the friends and relatives of the accused to remain
in the court room did not satisfy the statutory' requirement of a public trial.
A statute providing for exclusion of the public from trials involving certain
sordid crimes2 must be strictly construed. The mere anticipation of the
introduction of obscene or indecent evidence is not sufficient justification for
excluding the public from trials for offenses not specifically designated in
the statute. People v. Jelke, 123 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1954).
Pennsylvania was the first state to grant the accused the common law right
12. Roberts v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 188 N.C. 795, 125 S.E.
611 (1924); cf. Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).
13. Morris v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 88 Ga.App. 844, 78 S.E.2d 354 (1953);
Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Geist, 270 Mich. 510, 259 N.W. 143 (1935);
Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855 (1953);Sibothan v.
Neubert, 168 S.W.2d 981 (Mo. 1943).
New York, by statute, permits spouses to sue each other but removes the incentive
by preventing collection from an insurer even in the absence of a non-liability clause in
the insurance policy. Insurance Law §109 Subd. 3-a.
14. See, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. James, 80 F.2d 802, 803, 804 (4th Cir.
1936); Tomlyanovich v. Tomylanovich, Sopra Note 13 at 58 N.W.2d 864; Cartier v.
Cartier, 84 N. H. 526, 528, 153 Atl. 6, 7 (1931.
1. N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure §8 "In a criminal action, the defendant is
entitled: 1. To a speedy and public trial . . ."; N. Y. Civil Rights Law §12 "In all
criminal prosecution, the accused has the right to a speedy and public trial . . ."
2. N. Y. Judiciary Law §4 "The sittings of every court within this state shall be
public and every citizen may freely attend the same, except that in all proceedings and
trials in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape,
sodomy, bastardy and filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all
persons who are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers
of the court."
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of a public trial in a criminal case.: Subsequent to ratification of the Sixth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 4 most states5 have provided for
this right by constitutional provision," statute,7 or judicial decision.8
A public trial obviously is not one held in complete secrecy, although
unrestricted admittance of any member of the public wishing to attend
need not be permitted. It is recognized that the preservation of order in the
court room or the protection of the public morals may justify the exclusion
of part or all of the general public. 9 Limiting the number of spectators in
the interest of health or for sanitary reasons, 10 excluding young people in
cases involving morals and public decency,"I or temporarily excluding spectators
where necessary to enable an immature or emotionally disturbed witness to
testify,' " is not a violation of the defendant's right.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in support of indiscriminate ad-
miss'on of spectators is that contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion serves as an effective restraint on any possible abuse of judicial dis-
cretion. 13 There can however, be little question but that public policy op-
poses widespread disclosure of evidence tending to adversely affect public
morals. Whether such disclosure may be prevented by excluding the public,
or even a part of the public from a criminal trial is a fertile ground for
dispute. 14
A North Dakota case'" involving a rape of a female under the age of
fourteen years held that the accused's constitutional and statutory right to a
"speedy and public trial" had not been abridged by exclusion of all persons
not having a bona fide interest in the proceedings. A contrary view has been
taken by an Oregon court.'
It is submitted that protection of public morality amply justifies granting
a trial judge decretionary power to bar the press and at least a limited class
of spectators from trials concerned with crimes of an unusually sensational
nature. Although abuse of this discretion would amount to a regressive step
3. Pa. Const., Declaration of Rights IX (1776) as cited in Ins re Oliver 333 U. S.
266, 267 (1948).
4. U. S. Const. Amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial . . ."
5. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Wyoming do not have provision for
public trial. See In re Oliver, supra note 3 at 267.
6. E.g., N. D. Const., Art. I §13 "In criminal prosecutions in any court whatever, the
party accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial; . . ."
7. E.g., N. D. Rev. Code §29-0106 (1943); N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure §8.
8. See Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 At. 417, 422 (1914).
9. Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913).
10. People v. Miller, 257 N. Y. 54, 60, 177 N.E. 306 (1931).
11. See, State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 265, 79 N.E. 462, 463 (1906).
12. Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935).
13. See In re Oliver, supra note 3 at 270; Also, publicity given a trial may bring forth
witnesses not known to exist to the parties, Tanksley v. United States 145 F.2d 58 (9th
Cir. 1948), and the witness may be less apt to perjure himself if he knows that the
public will hear or later read his testimony, 6 Wigmore, Evidence §1834 (3d ed. 1940).
14. Judge Desmond, in the dissenting opinion of the instant-case, questioned the logic
that spectators may be dismissed because the court room air, is physically polluted but
stated that moral pollution can never be prevented by the judge. Compare Davis v. United
States, 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917) with People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N. Y. Supp.
433 (1900).
15. State v. Nyhus, 19 N. D. 326, 124 N.W. 71 (1909).
16. State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 298, 103 Pac. 62 (1909).
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toward Star Chamber'7 proceedings, review on appeal should render unlikely
such an eventuality.
LYLE E. BALL
TORTS - WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE - SURVIVAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION
UPON DEATH OF BENEFICIARY - Action was brought by the Administrator
of the estate of Julia Dianiska who was killed by the defendant's train. Prior
to the trial the decedent's only living next of kin who sustained pecuniary
damages died. On appeal the court held, that as there remained no living
beneficiary who suffered pecuniary injury as a result of the death of Julia
Dianiska and as the cause of action is not such species of property as will
pass to the heirs or next of kin of those to whom the right is given,' the
action could not be maintained. Danis v. New York Central Ry., 160 Ohio St.
474, 117 N.E.2d. 39 (1954).
At common law no action lay for the death of a human being caused by
negligent or wrongful act of another,2 regardless of the relationship between
the deceased and the beneficiary and of the financial loss occasioned by the
death.3 This rule was originally supported by the doctrine that when death
resulted, the civil remedy was merged in 'the public offense. 4 It was said to
be inconsistent with the policy of law to permit the value of human life to
become the subject of litigation.5 Lord Ellenborough's opinion in the case of
Baker v. Bolton,6 seems to be the primary authority supporting the rule.
In reference to the case Prosser says, "Lord Ellenborough, whose forte was
never common sense, held without citing any authority and declaring in
broad terms that, 'in a Civil Court the death of a human being could not
be complained of as an injury.' "7 The holding, which was criticized in both
Englands and the United States,9 was nullified in England by passage of the
Fatal Accidents Act of 1846,10 better known as Lord Campbell's Act. Today,
every American state has a remedy for wrongful death, most of which were
modeled after Lord Campbell's Act."
17. Smith & Zurcher, Dictionary of American Politics (1944) p. 291 "A secret pro-
ceeding in which a person whose interests are affected is given inadequate or no oppor-
tunity to present his case, and in which the proceedings are conducted and conclusions
reached in derogation of usual forms. The name is derived from the Star Chamber, an
ancient court abolished by Parliament in 1641 which had no jury and was permitted to
apply torture."
1. Ohio Rev. Code §2125.02 provides: "that the action shall be brought in the :lame
of the personal representative of the decedent for the exclusive benefit of the surviving
spouse, the children, and other surviving *next to kin of the decedent who have suffered
pecuniary injury as a result of such death.-
2. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U. S. 530, 539 (1932); Kelliher v. New
York Central & Hudson River Ry., 212 N. Y, 207, 105 N.E. 824 (1914).
3. Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754 (1877); Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg.
Co., 82 N. H. 268, 133 At. 4 (1926) (husband and wife).
4. See Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. McElwain, 98 Ky. 700, 34 S.W. 236, 237 (1896).
5. See Phillip v. Northern Pacific Ky., 46 Wash. 173, 89 Pac. 468, 470 (1907).
6. 1 Camp 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, (1808).
7. Prosser, Torts 955 (1941).
8. See Osborne v. Gillett, L. R. 8, Exch. 88 (1873) passim; Clark v. London Gen-
eral Omnibus Co., 2 K.B. 648 (1906) passim.
9. See West v. Boston & Maine Ry., 81 N. H. 522, 129 Atl. 768, 770 (1925); Rowe
v. Richards, 35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W. 1001, 1003 (1915).
10. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
11. Prosser, Torts 955 (1941).
